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Most qubit-based quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols extract the secure key merely
from single-photon component of the attenuated lasers. However, with the Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, the unconditionally secure key can be ex-
tracted from the two-photon component by modifying the classical post-processing proce-
dure in the BB84 protocol. Employing the merits of SARG04 QKD protocol and six-state
preparation, one can extract secure key from the components of single photon up to four
photons. In this paper, we provide the exact relations between the secure key rate and
the bit error rate in a six-state SARG04 protocol with single-photon, two-photon, three-
photon, and four-photon sources. By restricting the mutual information between the phase
error and bit error, we obtain a higher secure bit error rate threshold of the multiphoton
components than previous works. Besides, we compare the performances of the six-state
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SARG04 with other prepare-and-measure QKD protocols using decoy states.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)1, 2 offers information-theoretic security for two autho-
rized users, Alice and Bob, when communicating secret information along an insecure quantum
channel, while the laws of quantum mechanics bound the behavior of an eavesdropper3–6 . Since
its introduction in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard1, QKD has experienced great advances both
theoretically 7–12 and experimentally 13–18, and has become the most mature quantum informa-
tion technology for commercial use19. The study of QKD today is driven by the necessity to
close the gap between its theory and practice, as experimental systems tend to differ remark-
ably from their simplified mathematical models, and any of these deviations may open doors
to new attacks from Eve to compromise security. Some of Eve’s eavesdropping techniques
include simple individual attacks and Trojan-horse attacks, which one can overcome by inves-
tigating the bounds of information leakage in different scenarios and apply the suitable amount
of privacy amplification to obtain the final secure key20. Other side-channel attacks, such as
detector blinding attacks21 and time-shift attack22 that base on specific device imperfections, re-
quire more complicated QKD settings than the original BB84 to retrieve security again. Hence
the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD23–32 and device-independent (DI) QKD33–35
were developed to combat these experimental flaws.
Compared with the entanglement-based QKD protocols, prepare-and-measure QKD pro-
tocols are widely studied. The photon-number distribution of weak coherent states is Pois-
son distribution, which contains a fraction of multiphoton components. However, exploit-
ing photon-added coherent states36, one can acquire large probabilities of single-photon, two-
photon, three-photon or four-photon component. For the BB84 protocol, the single-photon
source is usually replaced by weak coherent states, which suffer from the photon number
splitting (PNS) attack37. The PNS attack, in which Eve blocks all single photon pulses and
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splits multiphoton pulses, results from the experimental variation of replacing the single photon
sources from the original BB84 protocol with practical attenuated lasers. In this situation, Eve
would forward some portion of multiphoton pulses to Bob through a lossless channel while
keeping the rest to herself in the quantum memory38–40, and measure her photons after receiv-
ing the basis reconciliation information obtained via Alice and Bob’s public communication.
The security basis of QKD provided by single photon pulses was guaranteed by the no-cloning
theorem41, and thus this attack was regarded as a major threat to QKD and has been exten-
sively studied37. Two major counter methods have been proposed. One is the decoy state
method42–44, which is a powerful method devised to analyze rigorously the extractible secret
key rate from the single-photon component of signal states, though its implementations would
differ slightly from the prepare-and-measure setup45–47. To overcome this attack at a protocol
level, the SARG04 QKD protocol48, which differs from the BB84 only in the classical post-
processing part49, 50, was proposed. In the SARG04 protocol, the reconciliation information is
a pair of nonorthogonal states, which cannot be perfectly distinguished and can be able to ad-
dress the PNS attack48. Subsequently, this prepare-and-measure SARG04 protocol was further
investigated and ingeniously converted to an unconditionally secure entanglement distillation
protocol (EDP) by Tamaki and Lo51, who showed that by exploiting the same arguments of
Shor and Preskill4, SARG04 protocol possesses the unique ability to extract the secure key
from not only the single-photon component but also two-photon component51, 52. This opens
the interesting question that under certain modifications of the original BB84 protocol, how the
secret key can be extracted from multiphoton states. The SARG04 protocol has been widely
investigated in theories49–56 and experiments57, 58. Similarly to the MDIQKD protocol, which
was proposed to make BB84 protocol naturally immune to all side-channel attacks on detectors,
the SARG04 protocol in MDI setting has been considered likewise59. Also, with the advantage
of secure key generation from two-photon component, recently a nonorthogonal state encoding
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method of SARG04 has been successfully applied to circumvent the forging attack of quantum
digital signature with insecure quantum channel60. A generalized SARG04 with six states (six-
state SARG04) protocol has been analyzed in ref. 51, which showed that one could extract the
secure key from the single-photon component to up to four-photon component. However, with-
out the explicit relations between the phase error rate and bit error rate of the six-state SARG04
protocol51, one cannot acquire the exact secure key rate.
Here, we generalize the EDP of ref. 51 to acquire the exact relationships between the
phase error rate and bit error rate of single-photon, two-photon, three-photon, and four-photon
components in the six-state SARG04 protocol. Furthermore, we carefully analyze the mutual
information between phase error and bit error, and discover that the mutual information of
two-photon component in a four-state SARG04 protocol and that of three-photon and four-
photon components in a six-state SARG04 protocol are not zero, so the secure bit error rate
threshold of those cases are higher than the results of previous works51. Finally, we perform a
numerical simulation to study the performance of six-state SARG04 with weak coherent states
in an infinite decoy states setting. Also, we compare the performance of six-state SARG04 and
other prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, i.e., BB841, 43, four-state SARG0448, 52, and round-
robin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) QKD protocols61–63 in the same situation.
Results
Six-state SARG04 QKD protocol. In this section, we introduce the six-state SARG04 QKD
protocol with ν-photon (ν ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) source. In this protocol, there are six polarization en-
coding quantum states, |H〉, |V 〉, |±〉 = (|H〉 ± |V 〉)/√2, |R〉 = (|H〉+ i|V 〉)/√2, and |L〉 =
(|H〉 − i|V 〉)/√2. The six states are then arranged into twelve sets {|H〉, |−〉}, {|−〉, |V 〉},
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{|V 〉, |+〉}, {|+〉, |H〉}, {|H〉, |R〉}, {|R〉, |V 〉}, {|V 〉, |L〉}, {|L〉, |H〉}, {|R〉, |−〉}, {|−〉, |L〉},
{|L〉, |+〉}, {|+〉, |R〉}, where the first and second states of each set correspond to logic 0 and
1, respectively. The steps of the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with a ν-photon source are
outlined as follows. Alice sends a series of signals to Bob. Each pulse is chosen randomly from
the twelve sets listed above, and Alice randomly sends one state from each set to Bob through
the insecure quantum channel. Bob randomly measures the incoming bit strings with one of
the three bases, Z, X , and Y . Afterwards, he exploits an authenticated classical channel to
announce to Alice the situations where he did not register any click at his detection unit, and
both of them discard these signals. Alice reveals to Bob the sets on which she encodes her
information. Bob then compares his measurement results with Alice’s set information. If Bob’s
measurement result is orthogonal to one of the states in the set, he concludes that the other state
has been sent, which represents a conclusive result; he concludes an inconclusive result other-
wise. He discards all the inconclusive results and broadcasts to Alice which of his results are
conclusive. Alice selects randomly a portion of her remaining signals and announces them to
Bob, and Bob calculates the bit error rate to test for eavesdroppers. If the bit error rate is much
higher than the upper bound, they abort the protocol. They perform error correction and privacy
amplification on the remaining bit string to obtain the shared secret key.
A virtual EDP-based six-state SARG04 protocol. To estimate phase error for privacy
amplification, one can construct an equivalent EDP version of the six-state SARG04 protocol.
First, we introduce some notations. {|0x〉, |1x〉} and {|0z〉, |1z〉} are the eigenstates for X and
Z basis, respectively. R = cos(π/4)I + sin(π/4)(|1x〉〈0x| − |0x〉〈1x|); T0 = I is an identity
operation; T1 = cos(π/4)I − i sin(π/4)Z+X√2 is a π/2 rotation around the Z+X√2 axis; T2 =
cos(π/4)I − i sin(π/4)Z−X√
2
is a π/2 rotation around the Z−X√
2
axis. In the EDP-ν protocol,
Alice prepares many pairs of qubits in the state
∣∣Ψ(ν)〉
AB
= (|0z〉A|ϕ0〉⊗νB + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉⊗νB )/
√
2,
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where |ϕj〉 = cos(π/8)|0x〉+(−1)j sin(π/8)|1x〉 (j ∈ {0, 1}). She then randomly rotates TlRk
and sends system B to Bob, where l ∈ {0, 1, 2} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Upon receiving the qubits,
Bob first applies a random reverse rotation R−k′T−1l′ , before performing a filtering operation
defined by a Klaus operator F = sin(π/8)|0x〉〈0x| + cos(π/8)|1x〉〈1x|. Then Alice and Bob
would compare their indices k, l and k′, l′ via public communication, and keep the qubit pairs
with k = k′ and l = l′ when Bob’s filtering operation is successful. They then choose some
states randomly as test bits and measure them in the Z basis, and compare their results publicly
to estimate the bit error rate and the information acquired by Eve. Finally, they utilize the
corresponding Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code to correct the bit and phase errors4, and
perform a final Z measurement on their qubits to obtain the secure key.
The six-state SARG04 QKD protocol is equivalent to the EDP-based six-state SARG04
QKD protocol, except for the only difference, a π/4 total rotation around Y basis. By analyzing
the virtual EDP-based six-state SARG04 QKD protocol, we give the exact phase error rate
formula, whose detailed analysis is provided in the Methods section. For the case with a single-
photon source, we have
ep =
3
2
eb, a =
3
4
eb, (1)
where ep and eb are the phase error rate and bit error rate, respectively. a is the probability that
both bit flip and phase shift occur, which restricts the mutual information between phase error
and bit error. For the case of a two-photon source, the relationship can be given by
ep =
2−√2
4
+
3
2
√
2
eb, a =
4 +
√
2
8
eb. (2)
For the case with a three-photon source, the error rates can be written as
ep =
1
4
+
3
4
eb,
1
2
eb ≤ a ≤ 3
4
eb. (3)
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For the case with a four-photon source, the error rates are calculated by
ep = min
x
{xeb + f(x)} , ∀x, 2−
√
2
4
eb ≤ a ≤ 4 +
√
2
8
eb, (4)
where
f(x) =
6− 4x+
√
6− 12√2x+ 16x2
12
. (5)
Now we reexamine the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol51, 52, and we find that the mutual
information between bit error and phase error of a two-photon source is not zero. The expression
can be given by
ep = min
x
{xeb + f(x)} , ∀x, 2−
√
2
4
eb ≤ a ≤ 2 +
√
2
4
eb. (6)
where
f(x) =
3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2
6
, (7)
from which we can see that this phase error rate formula is the same as the result in ref. 51.
The secure key rate of the EDP-based QKD using one-way classical communication can
be given by52
r = 1−H(eb)−H(ep|eb), (8)
where H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy, H(ep|eb) is the
conditional Shannon entropy function shown in the Methods section. We calculate the secure
key rates versus the bit error rates for the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with single-photon,
two-photon, three-photon and four-photon sources, as shown in Fig. 1. For comparison, we also
calculate the secure key rate versus bit error rate for BB84 protocol4, six-state protocol64, and
four-state SARG04 QKD protocol51. For the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol, one can extract
the secure key rate from ν-photon component when the bit error rate is no larger than 11.235%
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(with ν = 1), 5.602% (with ν = 2), 2.438% (with ν = 3), and 0.802% (with ν = 4). For the
four-state SARG04 QKD protocol with our calculation, one can extract the secure key rate from
two-photon component when the bit error rate is lower than 2.726%. We can see that the bit
error rate thresholds of single-photon and two-photon in the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol
are the same with the results in ref. 51, while the bit error rate thresholds of three-photon and
four-photon in the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol and two-photon in the four-state SARG04
QKD protocol are larger than the results in ref. 51. If we neglect the mutual information
between phase error and bit error, the bit error rate thresholds of three-photon (2.370%) and
four-photon (0.788%) in the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol and two-photon (2.710%) in the
four-state SARG04 QKD protocol are the same with the results in ref. 51.
For the phase randomized weak coherent state sources65, we study the secure key rate
with infinite decoy states42–44, which can be given by
R =Q0 +Q1[1−H(ep1|eb1)] +Q2[1−H(ep2|eb2)] +Q3[1−H(ep3|eb3)]
+Q4[1−H(ep4|eb4)]−QµfH(Eµ),
(9)
where Qn is the gain of the n-photon signal states which can be estimated by the decoy-state
method; epn (ebn) is the phase (bit) error for the n-photon state; Qµ and Eµ are, respectively,
the total gain and quantum bit error rate under signal states with µ intensity, and can both
be acquired directly through the experiment. We execute a numerical simulation to study its
performance, as shown in Fig. 2. In our simulation, we use the following parameters: the
detection efficiency is ηd = 43%, the dark count rate of each pulse is pdark = 1 × 10−7,
and the intrinsic loss coefficient of standard telecom fibre is α = 0.2dB/km. These values
are adopted from the 200km MDIQKD experiment data16. We also set the misalignment error
rate to ed = 0.5%, the efficiency of error correction is f = 1.16. For comparison, we also
give the secure key rates of BB84 QKD protocol43, four-state SARG04 QKD protocol52, and
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the RRDPS QKD protocol61 with the case of infinite decoy states. As shown in Fig. 2(a),
the secure transmission distance of the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol is more than 270km,
farther than the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol because of the higher bit error rate threshold
in the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol. The case of finite decoy states is considered in the Fig.
2(b). By exploiting one weak decoy state and vacuum state, one can extract the secure key from
single-photon component (see Methods). However, the secure key rate and secure transmission
distance of the six-state and four-state SARG04 QKD protocol are all smaller than those of
BB84 protocol since the bit error rate of BB84 protocol is small and the efficiency of basis shift
is high52. Meanwhile, since the security of RRDPS QKD does not rely on signal disturbance
monitoring, in our case where ed is low, the secure key of RRDPS QKD is much lower than
qubit-based QKD protocols.
Discussion
For each QKD protocol, how to extract as much secure key as possible is a critical task. Here,
we present the exact relations between the phase error and bit error as well as the mutual in-
formation parameters with single-photon, two-photon, three-photon, and four-photon sources.
Through restricting the mutual information, we have obtained higher bit error rate thresholds
of three-photon, four-photon six-state SARG04 and two-photon four-state SARG04 QKD pro-
tocol. In the quantum digital signature protocol with k + 1-participant60, 66 (one signer and k
recipients), the signer will prepares k copies of quantum states and send a copy of quantum
states to each recipient through the insecure quantum channel. To guarantee the security against
the forgery attack of untruthful recipient, the honest recipient needs to estimate the information
leak of his received quantum states, which will correlate to the phase error rate of QKD with
k-photon sources. The security analysis of the four-state and six-state SARG04 QKD protocol
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with two-photon sources has been used for the three-participants quantum digital signature60.
Similarly, we can expect that the security analysis of the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol
with three and four-photon sources can also be used for the four-participant and five-participant
quantum digital signature.
Methods
The six-state SARG04 protocol with single-photon source. We consider the following four
orthogonal Bell states
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
(10)
Alice prepares the initial quantum state
∣∣∣Ψ(1)AB
〉
= 1√
2
(|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B). If Eve per-
forms no attacks and Bob does a successful filtering operation, the quantum state shared by
Alice and Bob can be given by
|Ψ〉 = F
∣∣∣Ψ(1)AB
〉
=
1
2
√
2
(|0z〉A|0z〉B + |1z〉A|1z〉B) =
1
2
|Φ+〉. (11)
Here, we consider that Eve can perform the most general attack on all qubits transmitted through
the insecure quantum channel. By tracing out all other qubits, we can focus on one qubit state.
Let ρqubit represent a pair of qubit states that Alice and Bob share after Eve’s attack, which can
be given by
ρqubit =
∑
l,k
Pˆ
[
IA ⊗ (FR−kB T−1lB EBTlBRkB)
∣∣∣Ψ(1)AB
〉]
, (12)
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
EB =


a1 a2
a3 a4

 , Pˆ (X|Ψ〉) = X|Ψ〉〈Ψ|X†. (13)
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Here, EB is a 2×2 matrix representing Eve’s operations on the single-photon qubit. Meanwhile,
any quantum state in the form of a bipartite density matrix can be expressed by the Bell-basis
diagonal states. From Eq. (25), we can see that the Bell state |Φ+〉 is a reference state. Thus,
we have
PX = Tr[ρqubit|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|], PZ = Tr[ρqubit|Φ−〉〈Φ−|], PY = Tr[ρqubit|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|], (14)
representing the probabilities of only bit flip, only phase shift, both bit flip and phase shift,
respectively. Therefore, the probabilities of bit flip and phase shift can be given by
pbit = PX + PY , pph = PZ + PY . (15)
Let pfil = Tr[ρqubit] represent the trace value of state ρqubit. One can clearly see that pfil =
~a∗Afil~aT , pbit = ~a∗Abit~aT , pph = ~a∗Aph~aT , and PY = ~a∗AY~aT , where Afil, Abit, Aph, and AY are
all 4× 4 diagonal matrices, and ~a = (a1 a2 a3 a4) is a 1× 4 vector. If xAbit + yAfil−Aph ≥ 0 is
a positive semi-definite matrix, xpbit + ypfil ≥ pph will always be satisfied. If pph ≤ xpbit + ypfil
holds, then ep ≤ xeb + y becomes exponentially reliable as the number of successfully filtered
states increases51. By using the same argument, if xAbit ≤ AY ≤ yAbit holds, then xeb ≤ a ≤
yeb. The conditional Shannon entropy function can be given by
H(ep|eb) =− (1 + a− eb − ep) log2
1 + a− eb − ep
1− eb
− (ep − a) log2
ep − a
1− eb − (eb − a) log2
eb − a
eb
− a log2
a
eb
.
(16)
The six-state SARG04 protocol with multiphoton sources. In the case of two-photon,
for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix of quantum state shared by Alice
and Bob after Eve’s attack can be given by
ρqubit =
∑
l,k,u
Pˆ [IA ⊗ (FR−kB T−1lB E
(u)
B TlBR
k
B)
∣∣ξ(l,k,u)〉],
∣∣ξ(l,k,u)〉 = 1√
2
[〈ux|TlRk|ϕ0〉|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + 〈ux|TlRk|ϕ1〉|1z〉A|ϕ1〉B],
(17)
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where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1} and
E
(0)
B = 〈0x|EB|0x〉 =


a1 a2
a3 a4

 , E(1)B = 〈0x|EB|1x〉 =


a5 a6
a7 a8

 , (18)
EB is a 4 × 4 matrix which depends on Eve’s operation on the two-photon qubit and we can
safely assume that the final state of Eve’s system is a particular state |0x〉. Afil, Abit, Aph, and
AY are 8× 8 diagonal matrices, ~a = (a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8) is a 1× 8 vector.
In the case of three-photon, for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix
of quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve’s attack can be given by
ρqubit =
∑
l,k,u,v
Pˆ [IA ⊗ (FR−kB T−1lB E
(u,v)
B TlBR
k
B)
∣∣ξ(l,k,u,v)〉],
∣∣ξ(l,k,u,v)〉 = 1√
2
[〈ux|TlRk|ϕ0〉〈vx|TlRk|ϕ0〉|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B
+ 〈ux|TlRk|ϕ1〉〈vx|TlRk|ϕ1〉|1z〉A|ϕ1〉B],
(19)
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ {0, 1} and
E
(0,0)
B = 〈0x0x|EB|0x0x〉 =


a1 a2
a3 a4

 , E(0,1)B = 〈0x0x|EB|0x1x〉 =


a5 a6
a7 a8

 ,
E
(1,0)
B = 〈0x0x|EB|1x0x〉 =


a9 a10
a11 a12

 , E(1,1)B = 〈0x0x|EB|1x1x〉 =


a13 a14
a15 a16

 ,
(20)
EB is a 8×8 matrix which depends on Eve’s operation on the three-photon qubit. Afil, Abit, Aph,
and AY are 16×16 diagonal matrices, ~a = (a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16)
is a 1× 16 vector.
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In the case of four-photon, for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix
of quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve’s attack can be given by
ρqubit =
∑
l,k,u,v,s
Pˆ [IA ⊗ (FR−kB T−1lB E
(u,v,s)
B TlBR
k
B)
∣∣ξ(l,k,u,v,s)〉],
∣∣ξ(l,k,u,v,s)〉 = 1√
2
[〈ux|TlRk|ϕ0〉〈vx|TlRk|ϕ0〉〈sx|TlRk|ϕ0〉|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B
+ 〈ux|TlRk|ϕ1〉〈vx|TlRk|ϕ1〉〈sx|TlRk|ϕ1〉|1z〉A|ϕ1〉B],
(21)
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ {0, 1} and
E
(0,0,0)
B = 〈0x0x0x|EB|0x0x0x〉 =


a1 a2
a3 a4

 ,
E
(0,0,1)
B = 〈0x0x0x|EB|0x0x1x〉 =


a5 a6
a7 a8

 ,
E
(0,1,1)
B = 〈0x0x0x|EB|0x1x1x〉 =


a9 a10
a11 a12

 ,
E
(1,1,1)
B = 〈0x0x0x|EB|1x1x1x〉 =


a13 a14
a15 a16

 .
(22)
Since the photons of Eve’s system are identical, considering their symmetry, we have
E
(0,0,1)
B = E
(0,1,0)
B = E
(1,0,0)
B ,
E
(0,1,1)
B = E
(1,0,1)
B = E
(1,1,0)
B .
(23)
EB is a 16 × 16 matrix which depends on Eve’s operation on the four-photon qubit. Afil, Abit,
Aph, andAY are 16×16 diagonal matrices,~a = (a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16)
is a 1× 16 vector.
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Decoy state method with weak coherent state sources. By using decoy state method42–44,
one can have
Qµ =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
Yn, EµQµ =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
ebnYn, Qn = e
−µµ
n
n!
Yn. (24)
where Yn is the yield of n-photon. In this simulation, we use the case where Eve does not
interfere with the protocol. For the BB84 protocol, the Yn and ebn can be given by43
Yn =
1
2
[ηn + (1− ηn)pdark], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdark
2Yn
, (25)
where ηn = 1− (1− η)n, η = ηd×10−αD/10 is the channel transmittance, and D is the distance
of optical fibre. For the RRDPS protocol, the Yn and ebn can be given by61–63
Yn =
1
2L
[ηn + (1− ηn)pdarkL], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdarkL
2LYn
, (26)
where L is the number of pulses of each block. For the four-state SARG04 protocol, the Yn and
ebn can be given by52
Yn =
1
2
[ηn(ed +
1
2
) + (1− ηn)pdark], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdark
2Yn
. (27)
For the six-state SARG04 protocol, the Yn and ebn can be given by60
Yn =
1
3
[ηn(ed +
1
2
) + (1− ηn)pdark], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdark
3Yn
. (28)
For the case with infinite decoy states, one can use the Eqs. (25)-(28) to directly calculate the
yield and bit error rate of n-photon component43, 44. For the case with finite decoy states, we
must estimate the lower bound of yield Y Ln and the upper bound of bit error rate eUbn . One can
exploit three intensities µ > ν > 0 to estimate Y L1 and eUb1 ,
Y L1 ≥
µ
µν − ν2
(
eνQν − eµ ν
2
µ2
Qµ +−µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
, eUb1 ≤
eνEνQν − Y0/2
νY L1
. (29)
14
One can also exploit four intensities60 µ > ν > ω > 0 to estimate Y L2 and eUb2 ,
Y L2 ≥
2
µνω(µ− ν)(µ− ω)(ν − ω)
{
µω(µ2 − ω2)eνQν − µν(µ2 − ν2)eωQω
−νω(ν2 − ω2)eµQµ +
[
µ3(ν − ω) + ν3(ω − µ) + ω3(µ− ν)]Y0
}
,
(30)
eUb2 ≤
2
νω(ν − ω)Y L2
[
ωeνEνQν − νeωEωQω + (ν − ω)Y0/2
]
. (31)
For more photon components, the analytical method will become very complex to calculate the
yield and bit error rate. However, the linear programming25 is a good method. To estimate
the yield and bit error rate of n-photon, one can use n + 2 kinds of intensities. Since the
probability of multiphoton components is very small in the weak coherent state sources, we
simply consider the single-photon component contribution using one signal state, one weak
decoy state and vacuum state. The intensity of weak decoy state is 0.1 and the intensity of
signal state is optimal for each distance.
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Figure 1: Plot of secure key rates versus bit error rates for (a) six-state SARG04 protocol with
one-photon, two-photon, three-photon, and four-photon sources, and (b) BB84 protocol, six-
state, and four-state SARG04 protocol for comparison.
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Figure 2: (a) Plot of secure key rate versus fibre channel transmission for various QKD protocols
with infinite decoy states. For each transmission loss, we optimize the intensity of signal states.
For comparison, we set the number of pulses of each block L = 10, since the phase error
rate is n/(L − 1) for n-photon in the RRDPS QKD protocol61. It means that we can extract
the secure key from single-photon, two-photon, three-photon and four-photon components for
RRDPS QKD protocol. (b) Plot of secure key rate versus fibre channel transmission for various
QKD protocols with one weak decoy state and vacuum state.
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